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I. Introduction 
Many current public policy issues both exacerbate, and raise our consciousness 
of, the problem of how we account for our complicity in the world's evil. 
Pertinent to our purpose in this article are problems raised by the current debate 
on health issues. The inclusion of abortion coverage in a national health 
insurance plan and the role of the physician in public executions come to mind. 
Questions facing religious institutions and conscientious health-care providers in 
general, constitute an arena which should convince us of the importance of 
understanding the complex matter of lending ourselves to wrong-doing. 
These problems, and others like them, accentuate the renewed relevance of 
Catholic moral theology's traditional treatment of the concept: cooperation-
with-evil doctrine. Despite its relevance, despite the urgency of our 
understanding it well, the doctrine of cooperation-with-evil is seldom thoroughly 
and satisfactorily explored. Our purpose in this discussion is to show how we 
justify blame for complicit acts. First, we frame the doctrine within the broader 
picture of complicity and second, we recast some of the conditions of the doctrine 
into a more comprehensible framework. 
Several factors contribute to confusion about cooperation doctrine. The first 
two relate to the more general concept of complicity. One, the notion of the 
complicitous act is fraught with ambiguity. What is its nature? we must ask. 
What makes such an act culpable? Two, the very nature of the complicit act 
dictates that each complicit deed only analogously resembles other such deeds. 
For instance, acting as a lookout for a burglary and hiring a killer are both 
complicitous acts, but their point of comparison is obscure. Moreover, we have 
the important factor of the connection which joins a given complicitous act with 
the harm/wrongl to which it contributes. Whatever this connection is, while it 
resembles causality, it lacks causality's coherence. For example, the lookout's 
connection to a robbery is one of expediting. But we would describe the 
connection of the person who hires a killer to the murder as instigation. These 
connections, like the acts themselves, are also only analogous to the links present 
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in other complicitous acts. 
Thus, although we can easily understand the rationale which allows a nurse to 
cooperate with an abortion - the case familiar to us from many texts - we have 
difficulty expanding the notion to other cases. The precise the nature of the act, 
the exact character of the connection between the act and the harm/wrong, make 
application of the concept difficult. A clarification of complicity itself will make 
cooperation-with-evil doctrine easier to understand. 
Cooperation doctrine's third confusion producing factor lies in the similarity of 
the doctrine to the principle of double effect. Writers often imply that the two 
principles are nearly identical. Such an identification, however, obscures 
cooperation doctrine and makes it less understandable. A clearheaded account 
requires that proper distinctions be made between the two concepts. 
In this article, we hope to shed light on the topic of cooperation-with-evil by 
addressing the confusions we have listed. In Section II we lay down the 
characterizing features of complicit acts. We also discuss the analogous nature of 
complicit acts and its implications. In Section III, we focus on cooperation-with-
evil doctrine - elucidating its contrast to the double effect principle and by 
highlighting certain key concepts which make the doctrine distinctive. 
II. A Conceptual Explanation of the Complicitous Offense 
I. The Complicitous A ct as "Non- violating" and Incomplete. 
Our first objective is to set cooperation-with evil doctrine within the context of 
complicity in general. For our purposes here, we discuss complicity as positive 
collaboration, that is, as a participative act on the part of an agent who knowingly 
and intentionally takes part in a harm/wrong perpetrated by another person.2 
Positive collaboration also includes omissions to act when the agent's duty to 
prevent a harm/wrong clearly exists. . 
The complicit act has two philosophically interesting features. Complicity is 
by its nature incomplete. This means that we can only understand it in 
conjunction with the primary offense with which it is allied. Being incomplete 
does not in itself connote mitigation of culpability. The complicit act may be less 
blameworthy, but not necessarily. Nor does incompleteness imply that the 
accomplice's intention is less culpable from a subjective point of view. Thus for 
instance, we have Greek tragedy's classic case of complicity. Here Aegisthus' 
encouragement of Clytemnestra to murder her husband, Agamemnon, is less 
odious than the murder itself. But Aegisthus' influence entails equal guilt, not less. 
So too, Clytemnestra may have failed to carry out the deed. But possible 
frustration of the act does not affect the subjective culpability of the accomplice's 
intention. To deem the complicitous offense as incomplete simply means that we 
cannot give an account of Aegisthus' encouragement without Clytemnestra's 
killing, or her intended killing, of Agamemnon. 
As a corollary of being incomplete, complicitous conduct is "non-violating" in 
this precise sense: the conduct in itself violates no norms; its offensiveness resides 
solely in the circumstances which associate it to a primary offense.3 We do not 
describe, and then prescribe, specific complicit acts - for instance, hiring a killer, 
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providing a weapon, provoking anger, holding the victim down, and on and on. 
Such an enumeration would constitute a monumental task beyond the scope of 
any system of mortality. 
2. The Problem of Analogy and Connection. 
Even armed with the notions of non-violation and incompleteness, we still find 
complicity to be an ambiguous concept. An important reason for this ambiguity 
lies with its analogous character. Complicit acts themselves, and the connections 
between these acts and the harm/ wrong they help to produce, have fundamental 
characteristics in common. However, their circumstances differ enormously. Yet, 
we can only warrant blame for the collaborative act in view of this connection. 
The connection itself might ha ve one of a variety of descriptions: the accomplice 
might provide the weapon; he might encourage the killer; he might fail to warn 
the victim. Conversely, he might control the situation by instigating the offense 
and hiring the killer. 
In comparison to the primary offender's relatively forthright "causal" link to 
harm, the accomplice's connection is convoluted. Consequently, we have 
difficulty explaining exactly how widely differing acts can be complicit. We 
would be helped if the connection between the act and the harm were as 
straightforward a<; causality. We could then describe complicity as those acts 
which indirectly "cause" harm. Good reasons exist, however, for hesitating to use 
the terminology of causation. The Jewish tradition of "no agency" addreses this 
problem. For one thing, the accomplice's act does not, by nature of its being 
incomplete, produce harm. For another, if we say the accomplice causes the 
harm/ wrong, it can only be through the primary agent. We would then have 
mitigated the moral accountability of that agent. For this reason, the Jewish 
tradition does not recognize "agency", in which one agent acts for another. 
According to the Jewish teaching, if Person X is hired by Person Y to kill 
someone, Person X, the primary offender, bears sole responsibility. Person Y 
cannot cause him to commit murder. Likewise, H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore4 
distinguish between complicity and casuality in dealing with accessory liability in 
Common Law. They argue that 
The general principle of the traditional doctrine [on causation 1 is that the free, deliberate 
and informed act or omission of a human being, intended to exploit the situation created 
by defendant, negatives causal connection (emphasis included) .5 
The next best solution for defining the required connection is to describe the 
general conditions under which the relationship between actions and 
harm/wrong result, and under which they are considered culpable. In this way 
the connection applies to a broad number of instances. Common Law refers to 
"aid" and "influence".6 These terms - to which we might refer as "cause-like" 
- suffice to describe cooperation-with-evil as well. They cover the broad and 
often ambiguous link between the harm/wrong and the accomplice's 
participation. 
The problem for complicity then, lies in understanding the nature of the 
complicitous act and in explaining the relationship between the harm/wrong and 
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the non-violating, incomplete act which merely contributes to harm/wrong. 
With grasp of these notions we can better understand the culpability which 
attaches to the act. We can justify blame. This broad picture of complicity 
constitutes a context into which we can place cooperation-with-evil doctrine. 
Cooperation doctrine comprises a special case of the collaborative complicit 
offense. We must now consider it in more detail. 
III. Complicity as Cooperation-With-Evil 
The problem of complicity has been with us for a very long time. An early 
statement regarding the concept appears in the writing of Tertullian when he 
admonishes the idol makers: 
Nay, you who milke, that they may be able to be worshipped do worship .. . More are 
you to them than a priest, since it is by your means they have a priest; your diligence is 
their divinity (emphasis in original).1 
Clearly Tertullian has a strong conviction about Christians who craft idols and 
build temples - theirs is an unacceptable collaboration with idolaters. But his 
potent statement fails to provide guidance beyond the specific case because it 
lacks a formula by which we could first, determine the conditions which 
constitute such an offence (such as we called for above) and second, make a 
judgment of guilt in relevantly similar instances. Thomas Aquinas in the twelfth 
century provides more guidance and rational structure when he explains the 
sinfulness of these same idol makers.8 Where Tertullian relies upon rhetoric to 
make his point, Aquinas makes use of a reasoning strategy. We now call this 
structure the doctrine of cooperation-with-evil, and it owes the careful 
conceptualization it has today to another theologian, Alphonsus Liguori.9 
Aquinas, Liguori and subsequent theologians have developed a formula 
determining when the link between an agent, and a wrong to which he 
contributes, is culpable. 
1. The Description and Framework of Cooperation-with-Evil 
We begin by exploring the kind of cases which cooperation-with-evil doctrine 
addresses. Cooperation doctrine constitutes a special case of collaborative 
complicity. It functions as a conflict-resolving strategy, concerned with situations 
in which an agent's collaboration mayor may not be justified. The agent becomes 
culpable when he cannot vindicate his collaboration according to the appropriate 
conditions. 
Admittedly the doctrine owes much of its dynamic to the thinking behind the 
principle of double effect. Both address predicaments in which a refusal to have a 
connection with a wrong might seriously jeopardize the life or welfare of the 
morally conscientious agent or some other person. Cooperation doctrine 
however, is analogous to, but distinct from, the principle of double effect. It 
applies rather, to cases in which an agent might contribute to, rather than 
perform, a proscribed deed. We readily recognize as examples the classic cases of 
the nurse who aids in an illicit hysterectomy or the hospital which makes policy 
about such surgeries. 
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The doctrine's conditions include some, but not all of the criteria, which 
govern the principle of double effect. It makes particular use of the notions of 
intention and proportionate reasons for performing an act. However, two further 
conditions distinguish cooperation doctrine. The first - necessity - pertains to 
the degree to which the cooperating agent's act furthers the primary agent's act 
(or harm resulting from that act); to what degree the primary offense depends on 
the cooperating agent. How indispensable is the seller of guns, for example, to a 
murder? The second condition - proximity - addresses the similarity between 
the acts of the two agents: how close in description, and in effectiveness for 
achieving the objective of the primary offender's act, is the accomplice's act? 
Does the nurse's handing instruments to the surgeon, for instance, constitute a 
closer kind of participation than the orderly's delivering the patient to the 
operating room? 
2. The Considerations and Conditions of Cooperation-with-Evil Doctrine. 
A. Cooperation in Wrong or Cooperation in Hann? 
Before we discuss the conditions of the doctrine, we need to make a point 
about the nature of cooperation doctrine which allows us to expand its 
applicability. Theologians often describe cooperation-with-evil in terms of the 
cooperating agent's relationship to the will of the primary offender. 10 However, 
we find this notion difficult to defend consistently. Common sense suggests that 
the cooperating agent cannot sway the primary agent's will without the primary 
agent's direct awareness. Yet the nurse may never come into contact with the 
surgeon who performs the surgery. Furthermore, the surgeon's intention to 
perform the surgery gets him to the operating room. Even if once there he finds no 
personnel willing to perform the necessary preparatory tasks, the surgeon's will, 
or intent, may remain, though frustrated. 11 If the cooperating agent influences 
only the primary agent's will, the "cooperation" pertains to the primary 
offender's subjective immoral act rather than to an objectively wrong state of 
affairs or to the harm which might affect a third party. This idea narrows the 
application of cooperation doctrine. 
The question of influencing the primary offender's will is complicated, for 
example, by the case of Tertullian and the idol makers. We could argue that while 
paying homage to their deities is objectively wrong (in the eyes of the Christian 
Church), the idol worshipers' act is not subjectively culpable. In that instance, the 
idol makers' influence upon the idolaters' wills does not further wrong-doing in 
any subjective sense. It simply aids or facilitates an offensive state of affairs. 
Edmund Pellegrino,12 raises a more pertinent, and more interesting point, in 
applying cooperation doctrine to the obligations of the institutional physician, 
piquing thereby the issue of "cooperating-with-harm". His account implies that 
we should not limit the doctrine to the cooperating agent's effect on the primary 
offender's will, nor to his contribution to wrongdoing. We might well speak 
instead of the cooperating agent's contribution to harm. He makes compelling 
use of the doctrine to determine the liability of the prison or military physician 
whose obligation to his institution conflicts with his obligation to his patient. 
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Here Pellegrino goes beyond the dictates of the natural law to address the 
special obligations of the medical profession. He considers the duty of the prison 
physician who participates in an execution,13 or the military physician who 
declares a soldier fit to return to battle. Unless we understand the debate to be 
about the legitimacy of war or capital punishment in these cases, the physician 
neither sways the will ofthe primary offender - the institution - to commit, nor 
contributes to, wrong-doing. Sending the patient to war or to be executed harms 
the patient but does not wrong him. The physician does not influence the will of 
the institution so much as contribute to harming the patient. Thus the doctrine 
affords us a broader view of complicity when it extends to the cooperating agent's 
participation in harming third parties. 
B. The Conditions, and Considerations, for Culpable Cooperation with 
Harm/Wrong. 
The conditions which constitute the doctrine of cooperation-with-evil are 
familiar. In considering them therefore, we shall concentrate only on those 
aspects ofthe doctrine which are frequently confused with the principle of double 
effect. Furthermore, we shall consider the conditions in their positive light. In 
other words, though these conditions are often described as justifying 
cooperation, we shall examine them insofar as they justify blame. As we have 
pointed out, some moralists try to draw an exact parallel between the two 
doctrines, while they in fact differ importantly from one another. 
i. The nature of the act. The cooperating agent commits a non-violating and 
incomplete act. That is, the act is culpable but not because some precept prohibits 
it and not because it suffices to produce harm. We can easily see that the 
cooperating offense is both non-violating and incomplete. Were this act itself 
prohibited and capable of producing harm/wrong, the accomplice would be a 
primary offender rather than an accomplice, and we would not need to appeal to 
cooperation doctrine to explain its wrongness. 
Here we find our first important dissimilarity with the principle of double 
effect. Where the double effect principle depends importantly on the "intrinsic 
wrongness" of the agent's act,14 that condition becomes irrelevant in cooperation 
doctrine. The act itself is wrong only in its circumstances. One factor of its 
incompleteness is that its wrongness lies somewhere other than its being 
prohibited by a norm. We look to the deed of the primary offender as the source 
of liability for the cooperating agent in this sense: the collaborator's act is 
(objectivel y) wrong because the primary offender's act is (objectively) wrong. As 
non-violating and incomplete, the wrongness ofthe cooperating act itselflies only 
in its circumstances. Its wrongness lies somewhere other than its being prohibited 
by a norm or its producing harm. 
ii. "Formal" and "material" cooperation. The conditions of formal and 
material cooperation are likewise familiar to us. This condition more closely 
resembles the principle of double effect. An act of cooperation is culpable when 
the agent cooperates "formally" with the primary offender. Formal cooperation, 
which is always prohibited, consists in the agent's identifying with the will and 
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intent of the primary offender. 
The cooperating agent is also sometimes culpable when he participates 
materially and proximately. Here we have the first appearance of the proximity 
condition which distinguishes cooperation doctrine. In this latter case, the agent's 
act influences or aids the primary offender though he does not identify with the 
will and intent of the primary offender. However, his act might so closely 
resemble the primary offense that we would have difficulty in establishing its 
being non-violating and incomplete or insufficient to accomplish the harm; we 
could neither explain how the cooperating act differs relevantly from the 
prohibited act nor how the agent failed to intend the wrong. 15 The more closely 
the accomplice's act resembles that of the primary offender, the more likely it is to 
be culpable. A high degree of proximity requires that the reason for cooperating 
in the harm/ wrong be very important. 
We agree therefore with Grisez16 and 0'DonnelJl7 about the meaninglessness 
of the distinction between the immediate material act and the primary offense as 
illustrated in the case of the assisting surgeon, and we concur that such acts 
require no analysis in terms of cooperation doctrine. Because the acts in question 
would lack the component of being addenda, they resemble those described in 
the law as "conspiracy" in which each participant is a co-agent and equally 
culpable. Because they so closely resemble the primary offense, to maintain that 
they were indirectly intended would be inconsequential. The question of 
justification for cooperation arises then, only in mediate material cooperation 
which we could describe as influencing and/ or aiding. 
iii. Proportionate reason. We can state the proportionate reasons condition like 
this: the cooperating agent's contribution to a primary offense would be culpable 
if his reasons for cooperation were disproportionate to the wrong the primary 
offender commits or the harm he perpetrates. Because of the non-violating nature 
of the cooperating agent's act, this condition governs cooperation doctrine, as we 
shall see. Further, the complexity of the proportionate · reasons condition, 
together with its resemblance to that found in double effect doctrine, prompt us to 
ask these four questions: first, must we become embroiled in the debate over 
proportion found in double effect doctrine? Second, does the term 
"proportionate" involve us in problems of the weighing of incommensurate 
values and other difficulties inherent in consequentialist formulas? Third, what 
factors must the agent juggle in establishing proportionality? Fourth, how does 
the agent conduct this juggling? 
Our first question concerns the proportionalism debate in double effect 
doctrine. We find the proportionate reasons condition controversial within that 
doctrine because, there, proportionality seems to impact the very nature of moral 
reasoning. This impact occurs because the doctrine evaluates an act and 
determines whether or not this act does in fact violate a norm. On one 
interpretation, if this condition governs double effect doctrine, its moral 
reasoning seems to be fundamentally consequentialist. 18 
To claim, on the other hand, that this condition governs cooperation doctrine, 
does not entangle us in this debate. Proportionate reasons become the focal issue 
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in cooperation-with-evil precisely because the cooperating agent performs neither an 
"intrinsically" nor "deontologically" bad, (i.e., morally bad) nor prima facie bad, 
act. 19 If the cooperating agent's acts were bad in these ways, we would not require 
cooperation doctrine to analyze them. The act in question violates no norm nor 
value, even on its face. It presents a problem because, while non-violating, it still 
involves, through its circumstances, some ambiguous relationship to someone else's 
act. Granted the nature of the act, attention focuses on the circumstances surrounding 
it. 
Our second question deals with the problems of incommensurate values and their 
comparison. If we attempt to compare values as a way to evaluate the cooperating 
act, we find ourselves implicated in problems inherent in consequentialism. To some 
extent, we have here a language problem. The traditional terminology of 
"proportion" connotes the activity of quantatively weighing and calculating, etc., of 
values or goods. Alternatively, it could suggest finance-type transactions of 
exchanging one value or good in fair exchange for another deemed equal in worth. 
The problems of determining which criterion of value to use, or how to apply this 
criterion to such disparate goods, then faces us. In any sense, we find 
commensurability perplexing.20 We cannot compare the quality of life for the 
unemployed nurse to the life of the fetus. Other problems seem also to exist in 
determining proportion if we understand it quantitatively. 
An alternative view of how we arrive at proportionate reasons eliminates these 
difficulties. We might regard the question as one demanding - not calculation, such 
that the better course of action outweighs its alternatives by some standard of 
measurement - but prudence.21 In the first place, we have already established that, 
since the cooperating act violates no norm or value, our assessment of it concerns the 
circumstances. We might rather express the condition of proportionate reasons like 
this: we censure the cooperating act when a prudential judgment, which considers the 
disvalue of the primary offense, the situation of the agent and the circumstances 
surrounding his contribution to evil, deems the act as inappropriate. The importance 
of this articulation lies in the role of prudence for judging between incommensurate 
values by reason of the cogent circumstances. Circumstances might justify the 
physician's role in declaring a patient fit to return to battle, in Pellegrino's instance. 
Prudence evaluates these circumstances. 
We may now ask our third question: what factors must prudence juggle in 
establishing a proportionate reason? The intricacy and ambiguity of the act itself, and 
of its circumstances, make the establishment of a proportionate reason a convoluted 
process. The agent must evaluate an act, which though non-violating, somehow 
contributes to a moral wrong. The proportionate reason then takes into account the 
gravity of the primary offense in relation to the benefit to the cooperating agent. 
We judge the benefit itself in light of the necessity and proximity of the agent's 
contribution to the primary wrong. That is, the reasons themselves must be graver 
and the benefit more substantial, the more necessary is the cooperating agent's 
contribution, or the closer is his contribution, to the primary offense. We thus find 
ourselves in a labyrinth of considerations, and we need a unified and discriminating 
comprehension to deal with it. The ability to unify these disparate issues uniquely 
qualifies prudence for the task. 
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Our fourth question asks how the agent juggles these factors or how prudence 
operates in this situation? Prudence constitutes that ability to grasp as an 
integrated whole the intricate components of a situation and make a judgment 
about the right thing to do. We ordinarily describe the prudent agent like this: 
first, he possesses a keen insight into the value or norm at stake. He then "casts 
about from point to point", in the words of Aquinas, among the circumstances of 
the concrete situation, in light of the relevant value or norm, to determine the 
appropriate action. Thus prudent judgment always occurs within the objective 
restraints of the moral tradition, making the judgment "publicly intelligible".22 
Furthermore, the agent acts from a position of commitment to these norms and 
values. He is a generally virtuous person whose insight into the right thing to do 
stems from his devotion to his final end.23 
We attribute the effectiveness of the prudent agent to his aptitude for 
circumstances. With his eye - and heart - firmly fixed on the relevant norms 
and values, he possesses flair and imagination for determining what to do in the 
concrete situation. We might say he describes well: his competence consists in his 
ability to thoroughly and sensitively describe situations, taking into account all 
and only those circumstances relevant to the case; he manifests a moral awareness 
as well as a wide knowledge of human nature. Robert Henle24 draws the analogy 
between prudence and the ability to understand a political cartoon. This apt 
analogy emphasizes the importance of the agent's affinity to the context,25 his 
grasp of the situation, his familiarity with the setting and his ability to be 
imaginative. Ultimately, prudence coordinates the particulars within the broader 
picture and says: act like this in these circumstances. What then, does prudence 
look like in respect to cooperation-with-evil? 
The use of prudence within any casuistic framework - such as the doctrine of 
double effect - alters its character. Its use with the doctrine of cooperation-with-
evil changes it yet more. In the casuistic framework, the first departure from the 
ordinary use is this: casuistry requires prudence for determining culpability both 
as a teaching and juridical instrument. In other words, we use cooperation 
doctrine to distinguish between permissible and impermissible acts, not of 
ourselves, but of others. For instance, a medical ethics course might address the 
circumstances under which an institutional (prison or military) physician 
functions. A confessor or counselor may use the doctrine to determine the degree 
of culpability for someone's participation in an illicit act. In both these instances, 
the character and virtue of the cooperating agent, as it relates to the prudential 
judgment, may not be in question. Rather, the character and virtue ofthe teacher 
or judge might be at issue in their exercise of prudence. 
Moreover, in casuistic practice, prudence has additional tasks to 
perform. Casuistry usually requires that prudence place the act within 
the relevant taxonomy of cases. 26 But in cooperation doctrine, while 
the primary offense may fall into some such taxonomy, the cooperating act 
itself does not. It is a non-violating act. While we have only a given number 
of ways to directly violate norms, we have an unlimited number of ways 
of indirectly participating in their infringement. In this case, the 
prudent agent's keen insight into norms and values functions in a 
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peculiar way. The role of prudence is to perceive the connection between the 
moral evil, the non-violating act and its circumstances. We usually do not need 
such insight for the immediate and blatant offense. Further, the very nature of 
casuistic reasoning in these cases means that each situation is only analogous to 
the others because so many, and such varied, possibilities for collaboration exist. 
The ability of prudence to detect and articulate the ambiguous and analogous 
relationship is critical. 
Prudence next sorts through the benefit to the agent - a seemingly simple 
task. However, the agent must view this benefit in light of the necessity and 
proximity of his participation. Determining proportionate reasons, in other 
words, means grasping the ambiguous relationship between the primary evil and 
the cooperating act, and then juggling the evil of the primary offense and the 
benefit to the cooperating agent in light of two other issues - the necessity and 
the proximity of his contribution. With the exception ofthe primary evil, all these 
issues - the benefit to the agent and the necessity and proximity of his 
contribution - plus some others, fall under the rubric of circumstance. Prudence 
grasps and evaluates this complex situation. We now turn to the necessity and 
proximity of the cooperating agent's action. 
iv. Necessity and proximity. The necessity and proximity of the cooperating act 
govern the proportionate reasons condition in warranting justification or blame 
for an action. The necessity condition tells us what relationship exists between the 
acts oftwo or more persons. We have already suggested that the cooperating act 
is incomplete. The necessity condition reaffirms this idea but in reverse. In 
addition, the term "necessity" suggests a cause-like relationship. It tells us how 
much the cooperating agent's act expedites that of the primary offender. The 
more necessary the agent's contribution to the primary wrong, the more serious 
must be his reasons for cooperating if he is to escape culpability. 
The limiting case of the necessity requirement determines whether the wrong 
would occur but for the aid of influence of the accomplice. This requirement, 
while acknowledging the incompleteness of the cooperating act, supposes that it 
constitutes a more or less essential part of the primary offense. We measure 
necessity in this case, by degree and circumstance. How much does the primary 
offender need the assistance of the cooperating agent? Circumstances often 
determine degrees of necessity. For instance, if only one nurse lives in a certain 
village, his assistance to any medical procedure is more necessary than that of 
nurses in large cities. The agent depends on prudence to consider such 
circumstances and to determine the degree of his necessity to the primary offense, 
and more importantly, whether his reasons for participating and the degree of 
necessity together, outweigh the primary wrong. 
We have recently learned of experiments on radiation being carried out upon 
unsuspecting victims, by the United States government.27 If Person X is the sole 
record-keeper and corporate memory for the radiation experimentation records, 
her reason for not coming forward must be very grave indeed. The occurence or 
non-occurence of the concealment of the records depends solely, or heavily, on 
her. Other circumstances affect the question of her necessity. To what degree 
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would she recognize relevant data? Does her position give her credibility? The 
problem ofthe proportionate reasons remains, but Person X's necessity becomes 
clearer. 
We have greater difficulty conceptualizing proximity. The proximity 
condition tells us how much the cooperating agent's act resembles the primary 
wrong in achieving its purpose. The more closely his contribution coincides with 
the primary wrong, the more serious must be his reasons for cooperating. 
Immediate material cooperation constitutes the penultimate case and the 
proscribed deed itself, the limiting case. The inconsistencies which result from the 
long evolution of the principle of double effect and cooperation doctrine obstruct 
our ability to gain a comprehensive and satisfactory grasp of proximity. 
We might regard contributions to a proscribed deed as a continuum. Without 
prudence, such a view might imply a certain physicalism by which the act itself, 
apart from the human elements of knowledge and intention, possesses not only 
moral value, but quantifiable moral value. The prudent agent however, evaluates 
his contribution to the wrongful act and the degree to which it approaches the 
wrongfulness of the proscribed act itself. Prudence views the act as closer to or 
farther from the violating and complete nature of the primary offense. The agent's 
reason for participating in the wrong must be greater as his contribution moves 
up the scale toward unequivocal wrong-doing. Here again, our operative 
concepts fit only approximately, sometimes better, sometimes worse. The 
prudent agent is able to unify these approximate and confusing elements of 
necessity, proximity and proportionate reasons. Furthermore, he discerns from 
their perhaps unique configuration, the proper, and the loving, thing to do. 
This description of a moral act indeed seems strange, and like all analogies, this 
one clarifies some difficulties while obscuring others. The clerk who admits a 
pregnant woman into an abortion clinic plays a more remote role than the 
anesthesiologist who assists with the procedure. Proximity in time and place, 
which explain the immediacy of the anesthesiologist's contribution, seems to help 
explain proximity. This explanation fails though, to account for the case of the 
administrator of a group of hospitals who must decide about certain controversial 
or ambiguous policy matters. In this case the cooperating agent, the 
administrator, might reside in a city at a thousand miles distance and may make 
decisions a month in advance. 
We can only describe proximity analogously, for we seem to grasp the concept 
intuitively rather than conceptually. Each application of proximity constitutes 
merely an approximation of a model. The wide variety of situations to which 
these conditions must apply, the difficulty in specifying the necessity and 
proximity conditions and the commensurability problem which accompanies the 
proportionate reasons condition itself, all serve to complicate the doctrine of 
cooperation-with-evil. 
We have seen that an agent, or a third party, evaluates the agent's contribution 
to a wrong by first ascertaining whether the agent joins his intention - formally 
- to that of the primary offender in willing the wrong of the offense. Next, his 
reasons for participating in the wrong must be evaluated in view ofthe degree to 
which his contribution is necessary and the degree to which his contributing act 
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approximates the primary offense. The agent must then make the determination 
about whether these latter three conditions together are proportionate to the 
wrong committed by the primary agent. If any ofthese conditions is not met and 
the agent knows his cooperation to be unwarranted, but he chooses to make his 
contribution nonethless, blame for collaboration is justified. 
Conclusion 
Our view of cooperation-with-evil now appears within the general framework 
of complicity. An understanding of complicitous acts as incomplete and non-
violating helps us to understand the ambiguity of collaboration in others' wrong-
doing. The acts themselves, and the links associating accomplices to the 
harm/wrong in which they participate, belong to a kind of family - joined by 
analogy. We cannot say that an accomplice causes harm/wrong, but we may 
frame his participation as aiding and influencing. 
With this new understanding of cooperation-with-evil doctrine as part of the 
broader concept of complicity, we must consider the doctrine itself. Although 
cooperation doctrine resembles aspects of the principle of double effect, it is 
distinct from it. Cooperation doctrine deals with non-violating acts, insufficient 
of themselves to produce harm/wrong. The doctrine centers around 
proportionate reasons which must be balanced with the necessity and the 
proximity of the accomplice's participation. Cooperation doctrine can be 
expanded to explain cooperation with harm rather than only with wrong-doing. 
With this more in-depth analysis behind us, we approach once again the 
possibilities of lending ourselves to wrong-doing in our world. We consider the 
problems present in health care, in professional ethics, in public policy, with 
sharpened tools for moral diagnosis and for understanding. 
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